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Abstract
In a New Keynesian model with asymmetric information we show that publication of
macroeconomic projections and of the future interest rate path by the central bank can improve
macroeconomic outcomes. However, the gains from publishing interest rate paths are small rel-
ative to those from publishing macroeconomic projections. Given that most inflation targeting
central banks are already publishing macroeconomic projections this means that most gains
from increasing transparency in this area may already have been reaped. This, together with
the potential costs, may explain the relative reluctance of central banks to publish interest rate
paths.
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial increase in transparency about actions of mon-
etary authorities. Central bankers widely share the view that their main impact on the economy
is not via short-term interest rates they control, but via expectations of future policy actions. It
is fairly easy to show, within standard microfounded models used for monetary policy analysis
(e.g. Woodford 2003) that what matters for economic agents when they make decisions about
current prices, investment and consumption is the whole path of future expected interest rates.
Taking this into account, central bankers have made a great effort to, at least indirectly, guide
these expectations. All inflation targeters1 (IT) set publicly a numerical target for inflation. Most
publish reports, where they explain their monetary policies. Several central banks decided to pub-
lish minutes from meetings of their decision making bodies. Last but not least a vast majority
decided to show their inflation and GDP projections. On the other hand, however, only a limited
number of central banks decided to do — what on the first view seems the most efficient way
of guiding expectations on future interest rates — to publish their view on the most likely path
for interest rates. Currently only New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the Czech Republic show
explicitly expected interest rate paths. Other banks prefer to guide the markets indirectly 2.
The last two examples of increasing central bank transparency will be explicitly analysed in this
paper. We wonder why most central banks decided to publish macroeconomic projections but
only few started to show future interest rate paths. Obviously both decisions bring costs and
benefits. Central banks were reluctant to show macroeconomic forecasts because i.a. of possible
reputational costs related to being wrong. Moreover they feared that the conditional nature of
projections could be misunderstood — high inflation projected under a constant interest rate
assumption could fuel inflation expectations instead of showing that monetary policy would be
tightened in order to bring inflation back to target. On the other hand central bankers’ intuition
as well as formal models suggested that publishing projections and showing the model of the
economy could improve macroeconomic outcomes. Taking these arguments (and possibly other,
like peer pressure (e.g. Fracasso et al. 2003)) into consideration most inflation targeting central
banks decided to follow the path paved by the Bank of England in 1996 and started to publish
their macroeconomic projections in the form of fan-charts.
Similar arguments are raised in the debate whether or not to publish interest rate forecasts (Good-
hart 2001, King 2007, Weber 2007, Rudebusch 2008). On the one hand there are costs related to
reputation and misunderstandings. Central banks fear that showing an interest rate path may be
taken by the public for commitment to follow this path. This could negatively affect the bank’s
reputation once it deviates from the announced path. Additionally this could lead to sub-optimal
allocations if the conditional nature of these paths were not understood properly. Further, it is
difficult to embed interest rates paths into the monetary policy decision making process, especially
when decisions are taken by committees comprising of more than one member. There is also a
1We use the term inflation targeters for convenience. Obviously the analysis applies equally likely to central
banks who, like the ECB or the FED follow similar monetary policy strategies, without calling them explicitly
inflation targeting.
2See Rudebush and Williams (2007) for a thorough discussion of signalling of policy inclinations.
2
risk that revealing interest rates paths could constrain the monetary authority by narrowing the
spectrum of its possible future choices, thus undermining policy effectiveness. On the other hand
there are potential gains related to better guiding expectations and, as a results, leading to lower
volatility of output and inflation.
One possible explanation, why despite potentially similar costs central banks were much more
keen to publish macroeconomic projections than interest rate paths is that formally or intuitively
they know that the majority of attainable benefits has already been reaped by publishing the
macroeconomic projection (Kahn 2007). In other words, it is relatively difficult for agents to
model the economy and make forecasts of output and inflation. In fact only few analysts do so, the
majority of the population does not build econometric models. So, improvement in understanding
the economy from showing projections can be huge. However, once agents have the projection and
observe the behaviour of output and inflation relative to target they can relatively easily show the
likely direction in which interest rates will move. Hence, the informational gains from additionally
publishing the interest rate path may be minor.
In this paper we treat this problem formally. On the basis of a simple three-equation model of
the economy we calculate the potential gains from publishing a macroeconomic projection and
compare them to the additional benefits that can be achieved by additionally publishing an interest
rate path. In our model there is an asymmetry of information between the central bank and the
public which can be reduced either by learning on the side of the public or by publishing forecasts
by the central bank. Our results confirm the intuition: the gains from showing the projection are
substantially bigger then those from additionally showing the interest rate path. This means that
most gains from increased central bank transparency in this area may already have been reaped
when central banks started to publish projections. The remaining gains are relatively small what,
given the aforementioned costs and fears, may explain why banks are relatively reluctant to show
future interest rate paths.
The gains (and costs) of increasing central bank transparency have been recently widely anal-
ysed in the literature. The literature on the relationship between central bank transparency and
macroeconomic outcomes goes back to the 1980’s and the contributions of Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) and Goodfriend (1986)3.
The issue of publishing macroeconomic projections and interest rate paths constitutes only a small
subset of this literature. Tarkka and Mayes (1999) show on the basis of a Barro-Gordon model
that publishing forecasts improves macroeconomic performance, even if the forecast is imprecise.
Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002) show on empirical grounds that publishing central bank
forecasts is associated with lower inflation (though endogeneity issues cannot be fully ruled out).
Geraats (2005) uses a game theoretic approach to show that publishing macroeconomic forecasts
lowers the inflation bias. It must be however noted that the literature also describes negative
consequences of central bank transparency. For example in Cukierman’s (2000) model the central
bank reveals information about upcoming shocks and thus impedes its own ability to stabilise the
economy by surprising agents. Similar arguments are given by Gersbach (2003).
The issue of publishing interest rate paths has been taken up in the literature as well. Faust and
Leeper (2005) analyse data from macroeconomic projections of the Bank of England, the Fed
3Comprehensive surveys are provided by Geraats (2002) and van der Cruijsen and Eijfinger (2007).
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and the Riksbank. They conclude that the conditional forecasts published by these institutions
were of little value to market participants. Instead, they argue, central banks should show un-
conditional forecasts, based on the most likely path of interest rates. Ferrero and Secchi (2007)
review quantitative and qualitative interest rate forecasts of four central banks and conclude that
their publication improves the ability of market operators to predict monetary policy decisions.
Euseppi and Preston (2007) show that when the central bank does not have full knowledge about
the economy communicating details about monetary policy rules helps restore stability. Rudebush
and Williams (2006) use a standard New Keynesian model with learning to show that publishing
the interest rate path lowers the variability of output and inflation. The gains increase with the
difficulty to infer the objectives of monetary authorities. To our knowledge no study attempted
to compare the gains from publishing macroeconomic projections and the interest rate path. Our
paper tries to fill this gap.
On technical grounds our paper is directly linked to an increasing literature on learning4 and
its adaptation to monetary policy. Learning is a natural framework for analysing the gains from
increased central bank transparency. Under rational expectations agents know the economic model
and hence, there is no room for the central bank to improve their forecasts by revealing projections.
However, if one assumes that agent’s knowledge of the economic model is imperfect5, central banks
(assumed to know the model perfectly) can share their knowledge, hence improve private forecasts
and the overall macroeconomic outcome. On the other hand, if a central banks chooses not to
disclose its information, agents can be assumed to follow a learning process, i.e. use past data to
estimate the parameters of the underlying model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we
describe the issues related to expectation formation. Section 4 presents the simulation results and
section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model consists of three equations: a Phillips curve linking inflation and unemployment, an
IS curve linking real interest rates and unemployment and a monetary policy rule driving the
nominal interest rate. The first two equations are:
πt = γπt−1 + (1− γ)π
e
t+1 + κ(u
e
t − u
∗) + επ,t (1)
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ)u
e
t+1 + σ(i
e
t − π
e
t+1) + εu,t (2)
where π denotes inflation, u unemployment, i the nominal interest rate and the superscript e
stands for (possibly non-rational) expectations. For convenience, without loss of generality, in
4See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and (2007) for introduction and a comprehensive overview of the current
literature.
5This assumption seems justified as empirical studies like Romer and Romer (2000) and Peek et al. (1998) show
that the Fed has an informational advantage over the public when creating forecasts.
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what follows the natural rate of unemployment u∗ will be assumed to be zero. The terms επ and
εu denote iid shocks, being respectively N(0, σεπ ) and N(0, σεu).
This model is closely related to the hybrid version of the standard New Keynesian closed economy
model as presented in Giannoni and Woodford (2005). The main difference between our approach
and the New Keynesian model is the presence of the unemployment gap instead of the output gap.
This however is only a minor technical issue, since these concepts are closely linked by the Okun
law. The main advantage of such specification is that its parameters have been recently estimated
for the US economy taking explicitly into consideration forecasts of inflation and unemployment
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters – SPF (Orphanides and Williams (2007)). We believe
that, in the context of a model used for analysing systems under learning, such an approach
to fixing model parameters is superior to the usual practice of calibrating parameters or even
estimating them under the assumption of rational expectations.
Our benchmark calibration in equivalent to that of Orphanides and Williams (2007):
πt = 0.5πt−1 + 0.5π
e
t+1 − 0.192u
e
t + επ,t (3)
ut = 0.5ut−1 + 0.5u
e
t+1 + 0.036(i
e
t − π
e
t+1) + εu,t (4)
with σεπ = 1.11, σεu = 0.29. This model was estimated under the assumption that expectations
are formed at period t − 1 and we stick to this assumption throughout the paper regardless of
whether they are formed under RE or under learning6. The state space representation of our model
is presented in Appendix 2.
Monetary policy is modelled as a Taylor rule, linking the interest rate to previous period unem-
ployment and inflation:
it = φππt−1 + φuut−1 + εi,t, (5)
where εi denotes a monetary policy shock, which is assumed iid N(0, σεi). This reflects the fact
that the behaviour of monetary authorities cannot be described precisely by a simple (or even
complicated) rule. Central bankers take various information into account moreover, given voting
procedures, their decision cannot be treated as a linear function of the underlying economic factors.
We model these issues in form of a monetary policy shock. Following the estimation in Smets and
Wouters (2007) and deWalque and Wouters (2004) we set its standard deviation to σεi = 0.22.
We consider three variants of determination of the Taylor rule’s parameters:
• Standard parameters as suggested by Taylor (1993) corrected for the fact that instead of
the output gap we use the unemployment gap. Taking into account that the variability of
unemployment is about 1/4 of the variability of output, our Taylor rule becomes:
it = 1.5πt−1 − 2ut−1 (6)
6See Weltz (2006) for derivation and solution of a similar model under this timing assumption.
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• Optimal parameters derived from minimization of the central bank’s loss function under
the assumption of agents following rational expectations. Under this rule the central bank
follows the same policy regardless of whether agents’ expectations are formed rationally or
under learning.
• Optimal parameters derived from minimization of the central bank’s loss function, whereas
this time the central bank takes into account the way agents’ expectations are formed.
In what follows, these policy variants will be denoted respectively as STR, RETR and OTR.
In the latter cases the central bank minimizes the discounted sum of losses stemming from vari-
ability of inflation, unemployment and interest rates:
Lt =
∞∑
j=0
βj [π2t+j + λuu
2
t+j + λi(it+j − it+j−1)
2] (7)
For our model we assume λu = 4 and λi = 0.25, which is equivalent to a standard loss function
with the weight on inflation and output gap variability being equal and four times higher than
the weight on interest rate variability.
We decided to restrict our attention to the functional form of a Taylor rule and ignore fully optimal
(discretionary or commitment-based) policies for the following reasons:
• First, the functional form of such policies depends crucially on the underlying model. We
thought that it may be unrealistic to assume that agents know the functional form of compli-
cated, model-specific reaction function. On the other hand assuming that the functional form
estimated by agents differs from the true reaction function may result in non-convergence
to the rational expectations equilibrium (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
• Second, the literature shows that introducing optimal policies to models with learning may
result in indeterminancy (e.g. Evans and McGough 2005, 2006, Evans and Honkapohja
2006, Dennis and Ravenna 2007). This stream of research seems to be still developing and
we decided, at least as a first approach to avoid it. Nevertheless, we think that an attempt
to introduce fully optimal policy may be an interesting extension for future research.
In contrast to a number of recent studies (e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2007) and Rudebusch
and Williams (2007)) we do not introduce into our model variable natural rates (of unemployment
or interest) nor variable inflation targets. This decision comes from our preference to treat various
parts of the modelled economy symmetrically as regards the easiness of parameter estimation by
learning agents. For instance a variable natural rate of unemployment makes it more difficult to
estimate properly the Phillips curve and, hence, increases the potential gains from publication of
a macroeconomic projection. On the other hand a variable inflation target makes it more difficult
to estimate the monetary policy reaction function, increasing the potential gains from showing
the interest rate path.
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As a first approximation to how this affects our results we think that variable natural rates of
unemployment or interest are contemporaneously probably more confusing than variable inflation
targets. Central banks (in particular inflation targeters) have recently been very open as regards
publication of inflation targets while a substantial literature documents the difficulties related to
estimating natural rates of unemployment and interest. Thus, by omitting these elements we are
likely erring on the upside when assessing the relative gains from publishing inflation rate paths
and macroeconomic projections. Hence, inclusion of variable rates and targets would probably
reinforce our conclusions.
3 Expectations
We consider three variants of private agents expectations’ formation, depending on the information
on the economy and central bank preferences they posses. This information is assumed to be
conditional on what the central bank reveals.
The first variant, denoted by V1 refers to a situation when agents do not know the true structure
of the model driving the economy, the parameters of this model nor the central bank policy rule.
Such a setup may be considered to correspond to an opaque central bank who does not share the
results of his research on the structure of the economy nor macroeconomic projections with the
public. In addition it does not disclose the rule it uses to set interest rates. Like all IT central
banks, it reveals to the public the numerical inflation target, and the current policy interest rate.
Its projections, models and possible future interest rate paths are kept secret7.
Having no knowledge about the true model of the economy nor the central bank policy rule, agents
learn them on the basis of past data. To do so, they estimate a three-variable VAR(1), reflecting
their perceived low of motion (PLM):


ut
πt
it

 = A


ut−1
πt−1
it−1

+


vu,t
vπ,t
vi,t

 (8)
Estimation of the coefficient matrix A is performed equation by equation with standard OLS. The
estimation sample is a moving window and in the baseline scenario it covers 80 last observations,
i.e. from t− 80 till t− 1; the earlier data is simply forgotten by agents.
This VAR is next applied to compute expectations iet+1, u
e
t+1 and π
e
t+1. A two period-ahead
dynamic forecasts is computed according to:


uet
πet
iet

 = A


ut−1
πt−1
it−1

 (9)
7Examples of central banks operating under such a setup are usually new IT-adopters, who commit to an inflation
target but are not yet ready or fully convinced to disclose more out of their policy analysis systems. For instance
Poland used to operate under such a setup for almost 6 years after formal adoption of IT in 1998.
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and 

uet+1
πet+1
iet+1

 = A


uet
πet
iet

 (10)
Shocks επ,t, εu,t and εi,t at periods t and t + 1 are assumed to be unknown to the agents. The
expectations iet , u
e
t , u
e
t+1 and π
e
t+1 are then plugged into the true model of the economy, consisting
of (1), (2) and (5), to obtain the actual law of motion (ALM). When shocks επ,t, εu,t and εi,t
arrive this can be used to generate it, ut and πt.
The second variant V2 differs from V1 in that economic agents are assumed to know the macroe-
conomic projection of the central bank. Modelling this formally poses the question what it means
to agents to know a projection. Central banks usually show the projected paths for inflation and
output based on an exogenous (e.g. constant or market expectations based) interest rate path.
Due to the interest rate assumption, such a projection cannot formally be considered as an un-
conditional forecast of macroeconomic variables and we refrain from directly using it to construct
agents’ expectations. In contrast, we consider two alternative solutions:
• the projection can be considered as an additional dataset derived from the central bank’s
econometric model (which by assumption reflects the ALM of the economy). This dataset
may be especially valuable for agents since it is less noisy than macroeconomic data – the
only source of variability is the exogenous interest rate path while all shocks are set to zero.
Accordingly, we assume that agents append the projection data to the dataset they already
possess when estimating the first two equations of the VAR (8) (i.e. with ut and πt on the
left hand side). Agents do not increase their dataset when estimating the policy rule, since
they know that the data for it was generated exogenously. Hence, agents act as in V1 with
the only difference that they have a larger dataset. Expectations iet , u
e
t , u
e
t+1 and π
e
t+1 are
then formed according to (9) and (10),
• in central banking practice, an inherent part of showing macroeconomic projections is the
publication of the underlying econometric model. Since these published models usually do
not contain monetary policy rules this is equivalent to showing equations 1 and 2 to the
agents (at least to those who read central bank working papers). Since agents know the
model driving the economy, all they need in addition to build expectations for t + 1 is the
policy rule. Similarly to V1, they learn it from past data, which is used to estimate the
policy rule:
it = φππt−1 + φuut−1 + vi,t (11)
Estimation is performed by OLS, on an 80-period moving sample in the baseline case.
Next, agents add the estimated policy rule to the model of the economy published by the
central bank ((1) and (2)). Therefore the model (PLM) they use to compute expectations
for t+ 1 becomes:
πt = γπt−1 + (1− γ)π
e
t+1 + κu
e
t + επ,t (12)
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ)u
e
t+1 + σ(i
e
t − π
e
t+1) + εu,t (13)
it = φˆππt−1 + φˆuut−1 + εi,t (14)
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where estimates of parameters, obtained through learning, are denoted with hats: φˆπ and
φˆu. The model is solved under rational expectations, given the data for period t−1, and the
solution is used to obtain iet , u
e
t , u
e
t+1 and π
e
t+1.
Obviously, following these two approaches leaves the agents with different forecasts and results
in different ALMs. Intuitively publication of the model is more valuable than only increasing the
dataset, so the choice of the approach must matter for our results. It seems unlikely that all
agents read the central bank’s publication, but certainly some do. Moreover, their reading is often
shared with the rest of the population in form of private forecasts (e.g. published by commercial
banks). Accordingly, we decided to construct the aggregate agents’ forecast as a weighted average
of forecatst from the two above approaches (as in Muto 2008):
xet = px
e
p,t + (1− p)x
e
m,t (15)
where xet is the aggregate private sector forecast of the variable xt, x
e
p,t stands for the forecast
based on additional projection data and xem,t denotes the forecast based on knowing the model
(i.e. (1) and (2)). Having no direct measure of p we decided to take a conservative approach and
assumed for our benchmark specification that only 20% of agents know the model while 80% use
the projection to augment their dataset (i.e. p = 0.8). We check the robustness of our results for
different values of p.
The third variant V3 assumes full knowledge on the side of economic agents. This setup, with no
asymmetric information, may be regarded as referring to a central bank publishing its forecasted
path of future policy rates together with a macroeconomic forecast conditional on this path. The
public can then use directly the central bank forecast as its own. Technically, (1), (2) and (5) are
solved under rational expectations with the same timing assumptions as in V1 and V2.
As in V2, it is assumed that the central bank has full and correct knowledge of the economy and
the model it uses and publishes, consisting of equations (1), (2) and (5), indeed depicts the actual
law of motion of the economy.
The information structure of the variants described above is summarised in Table 1. We interpret
the gains from going from V1 to V2 as correcsponding to publishing a macroeconomic projection
and the gains from going from V2 to V3 as corresponding to additionally showing an interest rate
path.
4 Simulations and results
4.1 Simulations
We run stochastic simulations in order to compare central bank losses under different stages of
transparency discussed above. Each simulation run spans over Tsim periods, for which the values
of π, u and i are computed. We take Tsim = 100, 000, and burn the first b = 1000 initial, for we
consider them being too much dependent on initial conditions.
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V1 V2 V3
central bank IS equation IS equation IS equation
knows: Philips curve Philips curve Philips curve
policy rule policy rule policy rule
public Fraction (1− p): IS equation, Philips curve IS equation
knows: — Fraction p: projection Philips curve
(additional data for estimation) policy rule
Table 1: Information structure applied in the model
We analyse three simulation cases, each with different policy rule coefficients, according to the
classification presented in section 2. The first one assumes Taylor rule coefficients at standard
values of φπ = 1.5 and φu = −2 and is denoted by STR. In the second case, denoted by RETR,
the average central bank loss is first minimized subject to policy rule coefficients over the entire
simulation span and under the assumption of agents following rational expectations (variant V3).
The policy rule with optimal coefficients for this variant is next applied in simulations for two
remaining variants V1 and V2. In the third case, OTR, the most complex one, Taylor rule
coefficients are chosen for each variant separately so that they minimize the average central bank
loss.
In a theoretical setup, according to (7), central bank loss is computed over the infinite horizon. In
simulations we restrict the horizon to h = 500 periods ahead since βh is insignificantly different
from zero8 for higher values of h. So, the central bank loss in period t is computed as:
Lt =
h∑
j=1
βj(π2t+j + λuu
2
t+j + λi(it+j − it+j−1)
2) (16)
Minimization of the average central bank loss (AL) to pick the policy rule coefficients goes as
follows:
min
φu,φπ
AL = min
φu,φπ
1
Tsim − b− h
Tsim−h∑
t=b+1
Lt (17)
The minimization is performed numerically. The initial vector for V3 is [φu, φπ] = [−2, 1.5]. The
initial vector for V1 is the argmin reached for V3 and for V2 – the argmin obtained for V1.
Agents can choose different sample lengths of past data for the purpose of learning. In the baseline
scenario it is assumed that the learning sample smpl stretches over 80-periods (20 years), which
corresponds9 to the perpetual learning gain κ = 0.0125. Orphanides and Williams (2007) find that
κ ∈ (0.01, 0.04) perform best in modelling SPF expectations. They also report that this value is
in line with Sheridan’s (2003) analysis of expectations from the Livingston Survey data. For the
sake of robustness, we also analyse different values of smpl, ranging from 40 to 160. In the process
of learning, the regressions run by agents are tested for stationarity. Should this test be breached,
8We take β = 0.99. Then β500 ≈ 0.006
9κ = 1
t
under least squares learning with infinite memory
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the models’ coefficients used to produce expectations are set equal to the average of parameters
applied in the previous periods. In practise, we found this restriction binding only with negligible
frequency.
The main parameters applied in the baseline scenario are summarized in Table 2:
smpl = 80 p = 0.8 γ = 0.5
κ = −0.192 δ = 0.5 σ = 0.036
σǫpi = 1.11 σǫu = 0.29 σǫi = 0.22
β = 0.99 b = 1000 Tsims = 100, 000
h = 500 λu = 4 λi = 0.25
Table 2: Baseline scenario parametrization.
4.2 Results
The results for the baseline scenario are summarised in Tables 3 and 4. In order to easily com-
pare the gains from publishing the macroeconomic model and from publishing the policy rule we
calculate gains defined as:
Gi/j = −(
ALi
ALj
− 1) (18)
where Gi/j stands for gain in variant i versus variant j, and ALi denotes average central bank
loss in variant i.
The following findings stem from the baseline scenario simulations:
• Central bank loss decreases while moving from West to East in the Table 3 for any policy
rule. This indicates that adopting further transparency stages pays off.
• In all cases, gains for V2 vs. V1 are much higher than for V3 vs. V2. This points to bene-
fits from publishing macroeconomic projections being substantially higher than gains from
additionally showing the future interest rate path. For instance, under the optimized policy
rule (OTR) publication of conditional forecast improves central bank loss by 17.72 per cent
compared to improvement of only 2.61 per cent following the publication of unconditional
path of future interest rates.
• Comparison of central bank losses under the rule optimized for rational expectations (RETR)
and the optimized rule (OTR) confirms that the central bank can benefit from optimizing
the policy rule coefficients subject to the agents’ actual information. For example, compare
the loss for V1 under RETR (AL = 121.62) and OTR (AL = 95.81) – applying the rule
optimized under the assumption of agents following rational expectations for the asymmetric
information case V1 can end up with disappointing results. Indeed, even the standard Taylor
rule STR performs better in this case (AL = 95.85). Thus central banks should consider
redefining policy rules they follow when moving along the ladder of transparency stages.
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Loss Gain (in per cent)
Case nick V1 V2 V3 V2 vs. V1 V3 vs. V2
Standard Taylor rule STR 95.85 82.83 80.92 13.59 2.30
rule optimized for RE
(variant V3)
RETR 121.62 78.83 76.77 35.18 2.62
optimized rule OTR 95.81 78.83 76.77 17.72 2.61
Table 3: Average central bank loss and gains in the baseline scenario.
• The coefficients on inflation and unemployment in policy rule decrease10 along the W-E
direction for the case of optimized policy (OTR) (Table 4). This can be interpreted as a
need to limit the necessary degree of central bank responsiveness once agents get more
information on the economy and central bank preferences, ie. when transparency increases.
Such a result is consistent with the concept of using the central bank communication channel
as support to other transmission channels.
Variant
Case nick V1 V2 V3
Standard Taylor rule STR
φπ = 1.5
φu = −2
φπ = 1.5
φu = −2
φπ = 1.5
φu = −2
rule optimized for RE
(variant V3)
RETR
φπ = 1.16
φu = −1.47
φπ = 1.16
φu = −1.47
φπ = 1.16
φu = −1.47
optimized rule OTR
φπ = 1.48
φu = −1.92
φπ = 1.17
φu = −1.45
φπ = 1.16
φu = −1.47
Table 4: Taylor rule coefficients in the baseline scenario.
Some of these results simply confirm the results obtained in other studies (e.g. Orphanides and
Williams (2007) or Rudebush and Williams (2006)). Our main contribution is the result that
gains from disclosing the path of future interest rate by central banks that have already engaged
in publishing macroeconomic projections may be lower than those achieved after embarking on
disclosing macro-projections and macromodels they are based on. Weighted against fears of re-
vealing future interest rate path, this may explain the reluctance of certain central banks to push
their transparency framework that far.
To get an insight about the robustness of our results we also run the simulations for different
lengths of the past data span smpl that agents use for learning, for different fractions p of agents
using macroeconomic projections published by the central to estimate the model and also for
different variances of shocks to the interest rate rule σǫi . To enable comparisons, all the remaining
parameters were left unchanged at the benchmark scenario values, i.e. during each simulation only
the value of smpl, p or σǫi was altered. The range of smpl under analysis spanned from 40 to 160
10With the exception of coefficient on unemployment in V2 vs. V3. But the difference between the two is tiny
and may stem from random fluctuations in numerical simulations we perform.
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with a step of 20. In case of p, the domain stretched from 0 to 1, with a 0.2 step, and for σǫi we
used the values of 0.1, 0.22 (benchmark), 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5.
Results of simulations11 are depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3. As the sample length smpl used by
agents rises the central bank loss tends to be lower. This is in line with the intuition that using
larger data sets by agents enables them to better approximate the true law of motion of the
economy and thus lower central bank loss. As regards the fraction p, the more agents have to
resort to the macroeconomic projections published by the central, the higher the values of central
bank loss and the higher the gain from disclosing the interest rate path. On the other hand it is
worth noting that showing the IS and PC curves to the agents (p = 0) is almost equivalent to
V3. The additional gains from publishing the interest rate path become negligible in this case,
which reflects the fact the sole estimation of the Taylor rule is relatively unproblematic. A rising
variance of the monetary policy shock σǫi leads to higher values of average central bank loss, which
again is consistent with intuition. However, in all cases the difference between V1 and V2 remains
substantially larger than the difference between V2 and V3. This confirms our main finding that
the gains central banks have reaped publishing macroeconomic projections are very large relative
to the remaining gains that can be achieved by additionally showing the interest rate path.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the relative gains from publishing macroeconomic projections and
interest rate paths by central banks. Our results were based on a simple three-equation model
developed under the assumption of information asymmetry between the public and the central
bank. This information gap can be filled either by learning on the side of the public or by publishing
forecasts (macroeconomic or interest rate) by the central bank. Our model shows that the gains
from publishing the macroeconomic projection dominate the gains from additionally publishing
the interest rate path. This, in our opinion, reflects the intuition that it is relatively hard for
agents to forecast economic developments. However, once they have a hint on how the economy is
expected to move, they can relatively easily guess what will happen to interest rates in the near
future.
We think that this may be one of the reasons for why inflation targeting central banks, of which
most already publish macroeconomic projections, are relatively reluctant to start publishing inter-
est rate paths. Although we strongly believe that most banks will sooner or later follow the path
paved by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank and start publishing interest
rate projections, this reluctance seems symptomatic to us. It may be a sign that central banks
intuitively know what we show formally – that most gains from showing forecast have already
been reaped by publishing macroeconomic projections.
11We also checked two alternative Taylor rule settings with the central bank responding to period t or period
t+1 inflation and unemployment. The results remained close to those presented in the text. However, these models
tended to exhibit indeterminancy during the optimization process in V2. This may reflect changes in the Taylor
principle under learning as described i.a. by Eusepi and Preston (2007).
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This work leaves a number of issues open for further investigation. One relates to the question
how to best model the additional knowledge that agents get from the central banks macroeco-
nomic projections. This may require additional studies on the information content of central bank
projections.
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Appendix 1
Below we present the results of robustness checks.
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Figure 1: Average central bank loss for different values of smpl under various monetary policy rules.
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Figure 2: Average central bank loss for different values of p under various monetary policy rules.
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Figure 3: Average central bank loss for different values of σǫi under various monetary policy rules.
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Appendix 2
This appendix presents the state space representation of the model used in the paper:
πt = γπt−1 + (1− γ)π
e
t+1 + κu
e
t + επ,t
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ)u
e
t+1 + σ(i
e
t − π
e
t+1) + εu,t
it = φππt−1 + φuut−1 + εi,t,
where expectations are assumed to be formed at t− 1.
The matrix representation of the model is:
Γ0st = Γ1st−1 +Ψǫt +Πνt (19)
where:
• s is the state vector:
st = [it, πt, ut, π
1
t , u
1
t , π
2
t , u
2
t , i
1
t ]
′,
with π1t , u
1
t and i
1
t being artificial variables standing for inflation, unemployment and interest
rate in period t + 1 expected at period t (Etπt+1, Etut+1, Etit+1), and π
2
t , u
2
t standing for
inflation and unemployment in period t+ 2 expected at period t (Etπt+2, Etut+2),
• ǫt = [ǫi,t, ǫπ,t, ǫu,t]
′ is a vector of shocks,
• ηt = [η
π1
t , η
π2
t , η
u1
t , η
u2
t , η
i1
t ]
′ is a vector of endogenous expectational errors, as introduced by
Sims (2002):
πt = π
1
t−1 + η
π1
t , where π
1
t = Etπt+1 (20)
π1t = π
2
t−1 + η
π2
t , where π
2
t = Etπt+2 (21)
ut = u
1
t−1 + η
u1
t , where u
1
t = Etut+1 (22)
u1t = u
2
t−1 + η
u2
t , where u
2
t = Etut+2 (23)
it = i
1
t−1 + η
i1
t , where i
1
t = Etit+1 (24)
• and the matrices Γ0, Γ1, Ψ and Π are defined as follows:
Γ0 =


it πt ut π
1
t u
1
t π
2
t u
2
t i
1
t
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


(25)
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Γ1 =


it−1 πt−1 ut−1 π
1
t−1 u
1
t−1 π
2
t−1 x
2
t−1 i
1
t−1
0 φπ φu 0 0 0 0 0
0 (1− γ) 0 0 κ γ 0 0
0 0 (1− δ) 0 0 −σ δ σ
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


(26)
Ψ =


ǫi,t ǫπ,t ǫu,t
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0


(27)
Π =


ηπ1t η
π2
t η
u1
t η
u2
t η
i1
t
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


(28)
This model representation is equivalent to that described by Sims (2002) and can be solved using
his algorithm.
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